Primate Virtues: A Cross-species Study of Morality Essay -- Nietzsche

Primate Virtues A Cross-species Study of cleanity In his 1881 book, Daybreak, Friedrich Nietzsche wrote,We do not count on the animals as moral beings. But do you suppose the animals regard us as moral beings? An animal which could speak said, Humanity is a prejudice of which we animals at least are free.1 This passage expresses Nietzsches belief that animals do not judge human actions as morally good or bad. exclusively humans think in moral terms, Nietzsche believes a prejudice of which animals at least are free. That is, animals do not believe in godliness and modern philosophers, as well as behavioral biologists, would have to agree. Nobody suspects their dog of trying to maximize utility, follow categorical imperatives, or do repentance for his sins. Moral agency is uniquely human in this respect only we maintain that our actions have some greatermoralsignificance. Ethical theories try to submit us with a coherent and sensible account of precisely this moral aspect of human thought and action. But no matter how coherent and rational a given moral system may be, if it becomes too detached from our regular deliberations and actions, we do not consider it a correct account of our rule moral abstract thought. But what exactly constitutes this normal moral reasoning that humans allegedly possess?In this paper, I argue that human moral reasoning is actually a normal biological phenomenon that we share with the rest of the animal community, most noticeably with our closest primate relatives. I demonstrate this by use the standards provided by a normative moral theory to evaluate the actions of one of our animal relatives Pan Troglodytes, or the African chimpanzee, illustrating the fact that these ... .... Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1986. (p. 378).7 Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. David Ross. Revised by J. L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson. Oxford / New Yor k Oxford University Press. (p. 64). 8 Ibid. p. 70.9 Ibid. p. 69.10 Ibid. p. 35.11 See Pears, David. Aristotles Analysis of Courage. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 273-285. 1978.12 See Modern Moral Philosophy, esp. p. 354. 13 Mackie, John. A defensive structure of Morals. In 20th Century Ethical Theory. Ed. Steven M. Cahn and Joram G. Haber. New Jersey Prentice-Hall. 1946. 14 See Regal, Philip J. The Anatomy of Judgment. Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press. 1990.15 A Refutation of Morals, p. 146.16 Ibid. p. 146.